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Introduction
Uncertainty both pervades the current international security
environment and obstructs our view of how this environment will
evolve.
—David C. Gompert 1
While the world displays growing strategic uncertainty, apotential disconnect has developed between military andbusiness leaders on the treatment of uncertainty. The common
view held today in business is reflected in the observation that
organizations “abhor uncertainty.”2 Meanwhile, the military has long faced
uncertainty in the conduct of war.3 As a result, military leaders act on the
best information available about how a human enemy will reason or react.
Military theorists are familiar with uncertainty from Clausewitz’s term fog
that refers to the general unreliability of information.4
Uncertainty relates to both the existing state of an organization’s
environment and future outcomes. Uncertainty about the existing state an
organization finds itself relates to vague, fragmented, unstructured, and
the contradictory nature of information at a given time. Uncertainty
surrounding future outcomes results from an imperfect understanding of
variables and their relationship to enable predicting future outcomes. For
both state or outcome uncertainty, at least some uncertainty remains
irreducible in that not all available information or possible outcomes can
be known with certainty.
Uncertainty tolerance is an important aspect of personal and
organizational resilience. Similar to the relationship between a person’s
stress and performance, or teams and conflict,
it is likely that organizations perform best
under conditions with some uncertainty.5
After it is introduced, uncertainty likely
stimulates organizations to take actions to
become more robust. Uncertainty creates
stress by l imit ing the usefulness of
interpreting information with current
procedures.6 The response to this stress is
adaptive behaviors to increase uncertainty
tolerance. However, uncertainty can progress
beyond levels that can be effectively
managed.
Well-led organizations display greater
uncertainty tolerance and are more adept at
operating under uncertainty. They will have
an advantage over organizations less tolerant
of uncertainty. While uncertainty can reach
a point where it exceeds an organization’s
tolerance and performance falls, the
performance of organizations at the same
level of uncertainty varies based on their
tolerance to it and impact the effectiveness
of organizational responses to a changing
environment. The goal therefore is not to
eliminate uncertainty, but to benefit from it
through sound leadership. If differences in
operating under uncertainty exist between
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organizations, a competitor with greater uncertainty tolerance
will benefit from some uncertainty. Therefore, an obvious military
strategy is to reduce the amount of fog (or uncertainty) you face
about a situation’s state or likely outcomes relative to an
adversary. Leaders that use uncertainty to create opportunities
display the most advanced system of thinking about strategy.7
The goal is to change the rules of the game or get inside a
competitor’s decision cycle, so leaders and their organizations
can achieve success.8
The military’s history of facing an uncertain strategic
environment provides examples and guidelines for facing and
taking advantage of uncertainty. Outlining how leaders can
better respond and prepare their organizations for uncertainty is
the goal of this article. The article proceeds by first outlining an
historical example, and then using it to develop responses leaders
can take to increase their organization’s ability to handle
uncertainty. Before concluding with a discussion, the
performance implications of uncertainty tolerance are
considered.
Historical Example
An early example of the impact of uncertainty on a military
organization comes from a Greek mercenary force of 10,000
hoplites (infantry equipped with shields and spears) that served
and traveled into Persia with Cyrus, a contestant for the throne
of the Persian empire around 401 BCE.9 Following the battle of
Cunaxa, where Cyrus was killed by the forces of his older brother
Antaxerxes II, the real journey of the Greeks began, as their worst
fears were realized with the death of their sponsor.10 The Greeks
were in hostile territory over 1,000 miles from home.11
Additionally, the promise of wealth that initially motivated them
disappeared with the death of Cyrus. Further, the Greek hoplites
had already traveled and plundered the most direct route home—
largely a flat plain that provided an advantage to the Persian
cavalry.12 Following the execution and capture of their leaders,
the Greek mercenaries banded together, formed a council, and
chose the uncertainty of going north into the uncharted territory
of the Carduchian mountains.13
Following the decision to go north, the Greeks adjusted their
tactics and invested to improve their capabilities as a military
force. The Greeks first improvised their formation to form a hollow
square surrounded by hoplites to protect their baggage train and
camp followers.14 This change alone did not offer protection from
Persian archers and slings, as these light troops could engage the
Greeks from long range and disperse before they could be
engaged in close combat. Therefore, the Greeks scavenged for
horses to field cavalry, and invested in slings and bonuses for
people willing to volunteer as slingers.15 The Greek slingers used
lead, an improvement over the stones used by Persian slingers,
providing the Greeks a greater effective range.16
The retreat north welded the different Greek divisions together
with the common purpose of returning home. As the Greek force
entered the mountains, the Persian army stopped its pursuit
because few Greeks were expected to survive the oncoming
winter. Additionally, the Greeks had no maps and the local
inhabitants greeted them with hostility. Constant attacks
threatened to separate the Greek force as it stretched out along
mountain trails. The need for information resulted in sending
scouting parties to find routes and places to make camp and to
search for hostile activity. The need for information also led the
Greeks to take and question local prisoners. At one point, when
faced by a dead end guarded by hostile forces, two prisoners were
questioned about alternate routes.17 When the first denied any
alternative in the face of threats, his throat was cut in front of the
other. The remaining prisoner provided the Greeks another route
through the mountains, yet Greek losses in these few days were
comparable to the three months they spent in Persia.18
Sighting the Black Sea offered the Greeks a false promise of
the familiar and resulted in a splintering of the remaining 8,200
survivors into three groups.19 The smaller groups were more easily
harassed, and resulted in 1,000 Greek casualties in a single
week.20 Even when the mercenaries came upon Greek settlements
along the sea, their reputation preceded them and the mercenaries
were denied assistance. Not only were the Greek outposts along
the Black Sea not Greece, but the mercenaries themselves were
changed from their experience. The harried Greek mercenaries
increasingly relied on superstition and ritual sacrifice to divine
a way forward. Because they learned how to survive as soldiers,
the journey of the Greeks ended similar to how it began—they
became mercenaries in another fight against Persia.
The example of the Greek mercenaries and their response to
uncertainty offers three lessons. First, organizations respond to
uncertainty by investing in improving their capabilities. Second,
change that coincides with uncertainty affects both organizations
and their environment. Third, even in a changed environment
improved organization capabilities remain valuable. How these
lessons relate to uncertainty today is discussed next.
Responses to Uncertainty
Clausewitz identified two responses for managing uncertainty—
intellect and courage.21 However, the example of Greek
mercenaries suggests additional opportunities. First, the degree
of uncertainty that can be managed will be directly and indirectly
influenced by a leader’s actions. The Persian attempt to disband
the Greeks by removing their generals was overcome by the
Greeks forming a council that decentralized decisionmaking.
Second, the Greeks took action to increase uncertainty tolerance.
In response to environmental change, the Greeks used resources
on hand to field slingers and cavalry to keep their forces
competitive. Translating the Greeks actions to today offers two
strategies for increasing uncertainty tolerance—learning and
resource investment.
Learning
Learning reduces variation in performance and may involve one
of the most important ways to reduce uncertainty. 22
Organizations continuously learn by gaining knowledge about
their capabilities and environment, and learning faster than
competitors provides an advantage. For example, the Greeks used
scouts and took additional actions to learn more about their
environment. Additionally, organizations can learn simply by
exercising capabilities.23 The Greeks adapted a hollow square
formation and developed cavalry to protect their movement from
Persian attack. All organizations exhibit a capability to learn.
Experience increases the organization’s ability to effectively
handle the amount of uncertainty.
Knowledge is dynamic in the sense that the best source for
gaining additional knowledge is reflecting on what someone
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already knows. The fact that knowledge builds on itself causes
people with similar experience to develop their own language
for discussing ideas. As a result, organizations under similar
conditions evolve in similar ways as the demands of an
organization’s environment lead to the exercise of similar
capabilities. The result is for professions to display a common
body of knowledge.
The creation of standard bodies of knowledge also encourages
specialization.24 Specialization decreases an organization’s
variance by improving identification of possible outcomes and
understanding of cause and effect, or increasing its uncertainty
tolerance. Specialization can also increase variance between
organizations by enabling an organization to develop a
protective niche where it has a better understanding of the
potential outcomes for change. The military equivalent to
specialization is combined arms—the Greeks expanding their
infantry resources to also include cavalry and slingers with
ranged attack. Leaders will give their organizations the best
ability to tolerate uncertainty by increasing the diversity of
specialization. When uncertainty occurs where an organization
has specialized resources, it will be better positioned to respond
to change.
Resource Investment
Leaders can develop an expectation for change by investing to
improve an organization’s resources. Uncertainty helps justify
higher investment by providing organizations appropriate
resources to respond to competitors.25 The ability of
organizations to benefit from uncertainty varies because of
differences in learning and level of resource investment.
Resource investment likely facilitates innovation by enabling
organizations to act in accordance with the demands of an
uncertain environment.26 For example, the environment the
Greeks faced led to their investment in lead shot that gave their
slingers a relative advantage against the Persians. Sustained
investment develops valuable resources that build an
organization’s knowledge.27 Specifically, an organization’s
investment decisions and experience develop knowledge and
an ability to recognize and exploit information.
As capability grows, improved information results in an
organization having greater understanding of its environment
and for new resource combinations that result in innovation.
Innovativeness enables organizations to meet the demands of
an uncertain environment by enabling sporadic or even
continuous adjustments to organization resources and products.28
Developed resources help predict the probability of success
under uncertain conditions and provide resources that can be
applied to other uses. For example, the Greek hoplites fielded
cavalry from horses and soldiers already within their group or
from available resources that improved their performance. As
such, knowledge and resources have greater utility in uncertain
environments because they build uncertainty tolerance and allow
organizations to adapt and take advantage of opportunities.
However, resource investment offers diminishing returns
because uncertainty persists in the face of efforts to reduce it.
Continuing change may alter previous relationships resulting
in a mismatch between an organization’s actions and its
environment. Still, organizations should continue to invest in
new capabilities. Foremost, investments can introduce new
resources and pave the way for organizational change. For
example, the Greeks’ survival was aided by combined arms or
fielding cavalry and slingers that complemented their core
hoplite infantry. Additionally, success in using new capabilities
may depend on interactions with other capabilities or provide
an organization the ability to surge or respond to challenges.
Even in the face of diminishing returns, continued investment
still offers relative advantages. First, organizations may not
represent an equal threat to one another or have the same
uncertainty tolerance. Leaders need to recognize they only need
better information than competitors, not perfect information, to
have an advantage. Second, unsuccessful investments are still
worthwhile because knowledge generated will often be useful
elsewhere in an organization or in other contexts.29 In other
words, developed resources continue to have a residual value
that provides a safety net for continued investment. Finally,
uncertain environments may magnify the perceived value of
developed capabilities. For example, the experience of the Greek
mercenary force in retreat from Persia only made them more
valuable in the next conflict.
Uncertainty and Performance
Leaders need to consider the impact uncertainty will likely have
on their organization’s performance. The initial impact of
uncertainty will be reduced performance until adjustments are
made. As an organization adapts, tolerance of uncertainty
increases and performance should improve. For example, the
Greek hoplites were at a disadvantage to Persian slingers until
they adjusted their tactics. Organizations take action to reduce
uncertainty by improving available information. As swift moving
environments challenge beliefs, successful organizations accept
the need to have an ability to adjust by building in the
expectation for change.30 For example, the uncertain environment
confronting the Greek mercenaries served to clarify their goals
and strengthen their organization.
When uncertainty is accepted performance improves. It
provides purpose and efforts to increase knowledge and make
better choices. For example, it has been observed that people
learn to respond to chance in proportion to their observations,
or try to maximize the number of times they are right by
alternating their predictions instead of making the same bet every
time.31 From the perspective of organizations with better
information, knowledge should translate into making better
decisions based on a superior understanding of likely outcomes.
A complication is that people tend to have difficulty recognizing
when information is sufficient, past experience no longer serves
a useful guide, or there is too much information.32 Too much
information can result in worse decisions because irrelevant
information simply serves as a distraction.
If the environment continues to shift and no reliable
information on which to base decisions is available, performance
will decline rapidly. The only condition consistently leading to
success other than superior information is luck.33 As the number
of potential outcomes expands, small changes can have a big
impact and it may be difficult to know what has changed. The
implication is that uncertainty—even with knowledge—can
reach a point where continued success will depend on luck.34
Even though luck plays a role, organizations with greater
knowledge should enjoy luck more often. Differences in
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uncertainty tolerance should help explain differences in
organizational performance. When uncertainty begins to exceed
an organization’s ability to easily respond, small differences in
the ability of organizations to cope with uncertainty will make
a difference. In uncertain environments, the ability to make more
informed decisions rapidly will provide an advantage over
competitors.
Increased luck may relate to leaders knowing their information
is better. Differences in experience and accumulated knowledge
result in different perceptions of opportunity for the same
situation. For example, it has been observed that uncertain
prospects are viewed as less attractive when they are also
considered by someone else that is perceived to be more
knowledgeable.35 Though leaders may not know a complete set
of outcomes, they may be able to rule out bad choices or identify
better decisions than rivals.
Conclusion
Decisions are made despite uncertainty—even taking no action
is a decision. Better decisions are likely to be made under
conditions where an organization can tolerate and manage
greater amounts of uncertainty. As a result, the impact of
uncertainty on organizations is more complex than has generally
been recognized. Leaders can make their organization’s tolerance
for uncertainty more robust. While its introduction may be
unpleasant, uncertainty likely leads to a closer examination of
the environment and an organization’s role in it. This should
contribute to expanding an organization’s ability to make
decisions based on identified potential outcomes, and improved
decisionmaking from better information should contribute to
higher performance. Doing better than competitors depends on
higher tolerance of ambiguity from learning and capability
development that ensures better information than its rivals on a
range of topics. As such, leaders should ensure their organization
avoids specializing in too few areas.
Leaders can apply several lessons learned from the
observations and arguments explored here. First, attempting
something is the first step toward managing uncertainty, as an
outcome is certain only when no attempt is made. For example,
instilling the belief that something is impossible will likely
preclude any achievement inconsistent with that belief. As a
result, it is on the margins where leaders make the biggest
difference. If things went according to plan, we would not need
leaders. At the same time, greater demands and discretion under
conditions of uncertainty increase the responsibility for leaders
to act appropriately—integrity first.
Leaders also need to dedicate time to figuring out what they
want to achieve and how to get there. The challenge is to achieve
“transformation that is revolutionary in result and evolutionary
in execution.”36 The spoils will go to leaders of organizations
that manage uncertainty to favorable outcomes by making their
own luck along the way. There is no one way to be successful.
Leaders should seek to employ workable solutions that can be
adjusted as additional information becomes available, rather than
waiting for perfect solutions that risk irrelevance.
Notes
1. D. Gompert, Preparing Military Forces for Integrated Operations in
the Face of Uncertainty, RAND Issue Paper, [Online] Available: http:/
/www.rand.org/pubs/issue_papers/2005/IP250.pdf, 2003.
2. J. Thompson, Organizations in Action, New York, NY: McGraw Hill,
1967, 99.
3. B. Betros, Coping with Uncertainty. The Joint Task Force
and Multi-Service Military Operations, [Online]Available:
h t t p : / / s t i n e t . d t i c . m i l c g i - b i n / G e t T R D o c ? A D
=ADA240414&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, 1991.
4. K. Clausewitz, Von Krieg (On War), translation by Penguin Books:
London, UK, 1832.
5. L. Muse, S. Harris, and H. Field, “Has the Inverted-U Theory of Stress
and Job Performance Had a Fair Test?” Human Performance, Vol 16,
2003, 349–364 and C. DeDreu, “When too Little or too Much Hurts:
Evidence for a Curvilinear Relationship Between Task Conflict and
Innovation in Teams,” Journal of Management, Vol 32, 2006, 83-107.
6. P. Barr, and A. Huff, “Seeing Isn’t Believing: Understanding Diversity
in the Timing of Strategic Response,” Journal of Management Studies,
Vol 34, 1997, 337–370.
7. D. Wilkinson, Ambiguity Advantage: What Great Leaders are Greatest
At, New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
8. F. Thompson, “Business Strategy and the Boyd Cycle,” Journal of
Contingencies and Crisis Management, Vol 3 No 2, June 1995, 81-90.
9. R. Warner, Xenophon: The Persian expedition, London, UK: Penguin
Books, 1949.
10. R. Waterfield, Xenophon’s Retreat: Greece, Persia, and the End of
the Golden Age, Cambridge, UK: Belknap Press, 2006.
11. Warner.
12. Waterfield
13. Ibid.
14. Warner.
15. Ibid.
16. Waterfield.
17. Warner.
18. Waterfield.
19. Warner.
20. Waterfield.
21. Clausewitz.
22. E. Penrose, The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press, 1959.
23. B. Kogut, and N. Kulatilaka, “Capabilities as Real Options,”
Organization Science, Vo 12, 2001, 744-758.
24. A. Arora, A Fosfuri, and A. Gambardella, Markets for Technology:
The Economics of Innovation and Corporate Strategy, Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 2001.
25. D. Sirmon, M. Hitt, and D. Ireland, “Managing Firm Resources in
Dynamic Environments to Create Value: Looking Inside the Black
Box,” Academy of Management Review, Vol 32, 2007, 273-292.
26. M. Heeley, D. King, and J. Covin, “R&D Investment Level and
Environment as Predictors of Firm Acquisition,” Journal of
Management Studies, Vol 43, 2006, 1513-1536.
27. B. Kogut and U. Zander, “What Firms Do? Coordination, Identity,
and Learning,” Organization Science, Vol 7, No 5, 1996, 502-518.
28. V. Rindova and S. Kotha, “Continuous ‘Morphing’: Competing
Through Dynamic Capabilities, Form, and Function,” Academy of
Management Journal, Vol 44, 2001, 1263-1280.
29. A. Knott, “Persistent Heterogeneity and Sustainable Innovation,”
Strategic Management Journal, Vol 24, 2003, 687-705.
30. S. Brown and K. Eisenhardt, Competing on the Edge: Strategy as
Structured Chaos, Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1998.
31. H. Einhorn and R. Hogarth, “Decision Making: Going Forward in
Reverse,” Harvard Business Review, Vol 65, 1987, 66-70.
32. P. Bernstein, Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk, New
York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, 1996
33. J. Barney, “Strategic Factor Markets: Expectations, Luck, and Business
Strategy,” Management Science, Vol 32, 1986, 1231-1241.
34. P. Anderson and M. Tushman, “Organizational Environments and
Industry Exit: The Effects of Uncertainty, Munificence and
Complexity,” Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol 10, 2001, 675-
696.
35. C. Fox and A. Tversky, “Ambiguity and Comparative Ignorance,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol 3, 1995, 585-603.
36. G. Hamel and C. Prahalad, “Competing for the Future,” Harvard
Business Review, Vol 72, No 4, 122-128, 1994.
53Volume XXXII, Number 3
Quotes Boxed Set:
What You Need,
When You Need It!
Lieutenant Colonel David R. King is currently the
commander of the 667th Aeronautical Systems Squadron
(Gunship) at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. He is
an acquisition officer who earned his PhD in strategic
management from the Kelley School of Business, Indiana
Why a set of quotations for
Air Force Logisticians? An
obvious answer is there isn’t
one. But that’s not the only
reason, and it’s certainly not
the most important reason.
The primary reason for
producing this set was to
provide a teaching resource
that can be used in
classrooms, education,
training, and mentoring
programs for Air Force
logisticians. It is a tool that
can be used by instructors,
teachers, managers, leaders,
and students. It is also a tool
that can be used in research
settings and a resource that
should stimulate comment
and criticism within
educational and mentoring
settings. Copies of the set
are provided free of charge to
any Air Force logistician,
educational institution,
teacher, instructor,
commander, or manager.
Generating Transformation
Solutions Today; Focusing the
Logistics Enterprise of the Future
AFLMA
University. He has broad acquisition experience that
includes fielding and supporting the F-15, F-117, F-22, and
AC-130 aircraft. He is a frequent contributor to the Air
Force Journal of Logistics.
